

SUDAN

INTENSE CONFLICT AND ORGANIZED VIOLENCE - LEADING TO WIDESPREAD DISPLACEMENT, ECONOMIC CRISIS AND DISRUPTED FOOD PRODUCTION - WORSENS ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY DURING TYPICAL HARVEST PERIOD

IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ANALYSIS
OCTOBER 2023 - FEBRUARY 2024
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Overview

The latest projection update of Sudan reveals that intense conflict and organized violence, coupled with the continued economic decline, have driven approximately 17.7 million people across Sudan (37 percent of the analysed population) into high levels of acute food insecurity, classified in IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse) between October 2023 and February 2024. Of those, about 4.9 million (10 percent of the population analysed) are in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), and almost 12.8 million people (27 percent of the population analysed) are in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis).

An update of the October 2023 – February 2024 projection period was carried out in October 2023 to allow for the revision of classifications of several states as the monitoring of key drivers and assumptions of the last projection analysis (July 2023) showed several changes in the assumptions used for the projected period in Greater Kordofan, Greater Darfur, Khartoum and Al Gazira. While classifications of other states remain as initially projected, the area of Hamshkoraib in Kassala has also been revised.


Compared to the previous second projection analysis in June 2023, around 1.7 million (4 percent) of the population has shifted from IPC Phase 1 (None/Minimal) to IPC Phase 2 (Stressed), while the estimated populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) increased from 15 million people (31 percent) to 17.7 million people (37 percent). There has been a 4 percent increase in populations in Phase 3 and a 2 percent increase in those in Phase 4.

Conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and other organized violence continues to be the main drivers of life-threatening food insecurity in Sudan. The most acutely food insecure populations are in states affected by high levels of organized violence, including Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan and Khartoum – especially the tri-city area of Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman. Across all areas heavily affected by conflict and organized violence, civilians experiencing restrictions on movement, including due to sieges, are at heightened risk of high levels of food insecurity. Some sections of the tri-city area are of particular concern, including the al-Fatihab neighborhood of southern Omdurman, which is adjacent to an intact – though contested – White Nile bridge and other strategic locations.


Access to people in need is one of the greatest challenges facing humanitarian partners and stakeholders. The conflict dynamics have become increasingly complex, making it challenging for humanitarian partners to deliver lifesaving and life-sustaining assistance to people trapped in conflict hotspots, including Khartoum, the Kordofans, and the Darfur states.

In Khartoum state, 3,9 million people (55 percent of the population) face high level of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), while in Greater Darfur about 5,3 million people (that represent 46 percent of the total population in Darfur region) are likely to be in Phase 3 or above. In Greater Kordofan, about 2,7 million (44 percent of the total population in Kordofan states) are in Phase 3 or above. These figures are the highest ever recorded that coincide with Sudan's harvesting

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PROJECTION UPDATE: OCTOBER 2023 - FEBRUARY 2024

 17.7 M 37% of the population analysed People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4	4,898,000 People in Emergency
	Phase 3	12,828,000 People in Crisis
	Phase 2	17,983,000 People Stressed
	Phase 1	12,481,000 People in food security

Acute Food Insecurity Projection update: October 2023 – February 2024



Key for the Map IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- 1 - Minimal
- 4 - Emergency
- 2 - Stressed
- 5 - Famine
- 3 - Crisis
- Areas not analysed

season. Across all the states, 15 localities in Greater Darfur and 10 localities in greater Kordofan are classified in Phase 4 due to conflict, low production, high prices and limited humanitarian access for vulnerable people in need of assistance.

Ongoing conflict between the SAF and the RSF is deepening the humanitarian crisis and worsening the food security situations of the people in several urban, semi-urban and rural areas. The escalation of violence in Khartoum, Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan has triggered the large-scale displacement of 6.3 million people across all states of Sudan – including over 1.5 million people who have fled to neighboring countries, such as Chad (550,000), South Sudan (400,000) and Egypt (350,000). The conflict has also resulted in damage to and destruction of critical infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, schools, roads, power and water sources as well as telecommunications assets. Widespread looting of markets, banks, industries and public buildings has led to an increased shortage of essential services, food and non-food items across the country, further aggravating the fragile food insecurity and malnutrition.

Persistent intense urban conflict – particularly in key trade and commerce centers and along primary routes – is foreseen to continue, significantly hampering business operations. This disruption is expected to interrupt salary payments, diminish consumer activity, disrupt both food and non-food supply chains and lead to an economic contraction, thereby reducing purchasing power, which is only slightly supported by remittances from abroad. The price of food and essential commodities has soared, limiting market-access for people – particularly those that do not rely on agriculture. According to reports from numerous states, including those unaffected by the ongoing fighting, the conflict between SAF and RSF in Sudan is endangering the production of staple crops this year due to limited availability and distribution of seeds, inputs and agricultural finance as well as restricted access to land for cultivation, livestock movement and seasonal activities. Despite the continued challenges, humanitarian assistance has played a crucial role in providing live saving support to people in need. With the provision of humanitarian assistance, many of the areas facing intense conflict will are likely to experience higher levels of food insecurity.

Key Drivers



Conflict and organized violence: Conflict and organized violence – including intercommunal violence – throughout the country have caused massive loss of life, destruction and damage to major infrastructure and livelihoods, widespread and largescale displacement, and severe disruption of supply chains and basic services. The direct and indirect impacts of organized violence are likely to continue disrupting agricultural and livestock production – including during the harvesting season – market systems and humanitarian assistance provision. Khartoum State, Greater Darfur and parts of Greater Kordofan are likely to remain the worst-affected areas, though most states are impacted by organized violence. Extreme restriction of movement due to organized violence and armed actor policies remain of particular concern in several of the worst-affected areas, including the tri-city area of Khartoum State.



Macroeconomic crisis: The Sudanese pound (SDG) continues to depreciate due to increased demand for hard currencies by both the government and private sector, contributing to declining consumer activity. Disruption to domestic food production, processing and distribution will continue to raise demand for imported staple foods. The financial sector will continue to be severely disrupted due to conflict – including continued fiscal and balance of payments deficits – leading to higher inflation. The conflict will continue to negatively impact business operations and job opportunities, as well as disrupt supply chains for both import and export.



Low agricultural production: Escalated conflict and insecurity, combined with below average rainfall limited access to agricultural financial resources and negatively impacted agricultural production which resulted in hampered yields. The season was also challenged by pests and crop diseases and delayed pest assessment. This will likely lead to a more significant proportion of households relying on markets and humanitarian assistance for their food consumption.



High food prices: While the currency is expected to further depreciate, the prices of imported goods and locally produced goods across the country will continue to increase.




Climatic shocks: Main season rainfall is forecasted to be below-average, which will negatively affect agricultural production as well as water availability and pasture conditions for livestock, in turn impeding access to food.



Displacement: Conflict-driven displacement triggers a deterioration in living standards and a loss of assets, home and land. People are unable to pursue their former work, leading to unemployment, underemployment or informal work and high levels of acute food insecurity.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PROJECTION UPDATE SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (OCTOBER 2023 – FEBRUARY 2024)



Key for the Map
IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification
 (mapped Phase represents highest severity affecting at least 20% of the population)

- 1 - Minimal
- 2 - Stressed
- 3 - Crisis
- 4 - Emergency
- 5 - Famine
- Areas not analysed

Evidence Level
 ** Medium

Updated population table for the projection period: October 2023 – February 2024

State	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Phase 3+	
		#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%
Aj Jazirah	5,938,705	1,892,529	32	2,179,774	37	1,448,510	24	417,893	7	0	0	1,866,403	31
Blue Nile	1,416,233	547,029	39	578,847	41	209,786	15	80,571	6	0	0	290,357	21
Central Darfur	1,901,819	310,267	16	662,486	35	612,759	32	316,307	17	0	0	929,066	49
East Darfur	1,176,114	256,074	22	368,878	31	408,045	35	143,116	12	0	0	551,161	47
Gedaref	2,788,911	1,097,021	39	1,149,004	41	536,287	19	6,599	0	0	0	542,886	19
Kassala	2,886,457	571,891	20	1,062,876	37	1,021,773	35	229,917	8	0	0	1,251,690	43
Khartoum	7,066,162	821,018	12	2,370,339	34	2,708,608	38	1,166,197	17	0	0	3,874,805	55
North Darfur	2,530,410	631,666	25	933,093	37	652,809	26	312,842	12	0	0	965,651	38
North Kordofan	2,224,492	563,742	25	706,195	32	683,369	31	271,186	12	0	0	954,555	43
Northern	1,386,956	494,163	36	637,196	46	186,250	13	69,348	5	0	0	255,598	18
Red Sea	1,632,391	465,447	29	769,182	47	335,862	21	61,900	4	0	0	397,762	24
River Nile	2,088,028	829,747	40	1,010,908	48	217,875	10	29,498	1	0	0	247,373	12
Sennar	2,403,581	1,064,550	44	927,754	39	318,841	13	92,436	4	0	0	411,277	17
South Darfur	3,937,539	801,588	20	1,422,501	36	1,163,935	30	549,515	14	0	0	1,713,450	44
South Kordofan	2,077,654	336,662	16	746,809	36	690,123	33	304,060	15	0	0	994,183	48
West Darfur	1,891,564	263,365	14	497,017	26	721,200	38	409,982	22	0	0	1,131,182	60
West Kordofan	1,735,672	420,608	24	584,003	34	449,343	26	281,719	16	0	0	731,062	42
White Nile	3,108,018	1,113,819	36	1,375,780	44	463,018	15	155,401	5	0	0	618,419	20
Total	48,190,706	12,481,185	26	17,982,640	37	12,828,395	27	4,898,486	10	0	0	17,726,882	37

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PROJECTION UPDATE SITUATION OVERVIEW AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS (OCTOBER 2023 – FEBRUARY 2024)

Conflict and organized violence: In Khartoum, Greater Darfur and parts of Greater Kordofan, intense organized violence, often accompanied by massive looting of both public and private properties and the targeting of civilians, is likely to continue. Organized violence is expanding, including conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and other intercommunal violence along ethnic lines. Urban areas are particularly affected, especially the tri-city area of southern Khartoum city, Khartoum Bahri, and Omdurman, as well as state capitals in greater Darfur and greater Kordofan. El Fasher City, the capital of North Darfur State, and El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan State, are of particular concern for an escalation in organized violence in the projection period. Semi-urban areas – particularly in the peripheries to state capitals – as well as rural areas are also affected, especially in greater Darfur. Extreme restrictions of movement due to organized violence and armed actor policies remain of particular concern in several of the worst-affected areas, including the tri-city area of Khartoum State.

Macroeconomic crisis: The Sudanese pound (SDG) continues to depreciate due to increased demand for hard currencies by both the government and private sector, contributing to declining consumer activity. Disruption to domestic food production, processing and distribution will continue to raise demand for imported staple foods. The financial sector will continue to be severely disrupted due to conflict – including continued fiscal and balance of payments deficits – leading to higher inflation. Conflict and organized violence will continue to negatively impact business operations and labour opportunities, as well as disrupt supply chains for both imports and exports.

Displacement: The conflict has triggered mass displacement nationwide, with an estimated 6.3 million people including about 5.1 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 1.2 million refugees, fleeing their homes by late November 2023, as reported by the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The majority of IDPs hail from eight states, with Khartoum state accounting for the largest portion (67 percent) of displacements. The displaced population is dispersed across all 18 states of Sudan and out of the country, especially Chad, South Sudan and Egypt.

Rainfall performance: The rainy season from June to September 2023 was generally within the average to above-average range, but localized disruptions in the distribution of rainfall affected the course of the agricultural season. Specific irregularities in the timing and spatial distribution of rainfall, coupled with consistently higher-than-average temperatures, have exacerbated the adverse effects of conflict on agricultural production.

Crop performance: Agricultural production is expected to be below average in some rainfed areas in Sudan, particularly in localized areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, where harvests are projected to be significantly below average. West and Central Darfur states are likely to have severely reduced harvests due to conflict and organized violence which has limited farmers access to land and inhibited the availability of critical agricultural inputs. There are also some concerns about desert locusts, given the limited functionality of the government entities responsible for prevention and response as well as a shortage of pesticides.

The irrigated sector also suffered from the partial cleaning and irregular maintenance of irrigation canals. Delay of irrigation and shortage of rains during the sowing dates affected the establishment of crops especially cotton and groundnut in the Gezira Scheme.

Livestock production: Livestock production is likely to be constrained by reduced availability of and access to animal vaccinations, reduced access to water and pasture in some areas, and disrupted seasonal migrations in many areas due to organized violence.

Staple food prices: Extensive destruction and/or disruption of key markets, trade hubs and transportation corridors in Sudan, as well as with neighboring countries, remains likely. New or intensified organized violence around key infrastructure like Nile bridges, as well as major crossroads like El Obeid, have worsened the outlook for domestic trade routes. The limited purchasing power of most households and the loss of Khartoum City market have led to a decrease in the price of cereals. With expectations of reduced harvest, prices are likely to remain atypically high in the harvest period and will likely rise further during the post-harvest period.

Purchasing power: The labour-to-sorghum terms of trade in the east are expected to continue to improve during the peak harvest period between November 2023 and January 2024 as demand remains strong while sorghum prices remain relatively lower than usual. The prolonged violence has interfered with typical labour patterns. This year, the labour flows have been lower while demand has been reduced in many places due to below-average cultivation and the projected below-average harvest.



Food imports: Sudan's ability to import wheat is likely to face increased difficulties through 2023 given the ongoing conflict and economic crisis in the country. This is reducing public and private revenue and disrupting trade flows, amid ongoing challenges to global supply chains for key commodities like wheat and edible oils due to El Nino, Black Sea region conflict, and other issues.

Domestic trade flow and market functionality: It is expected that routes linking Khartoum to the rest of the country will remain disrupted through the projection period, with periodic disruption along the only functional Dongola-Omdurman route. Routes linking Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur to central Sudan and all routes between Darfur states will also remain largely inaccessible at least through the first half of the projected period.

Humanitarian food assistance: The provision of humanitarian food assistance will continue to face considerable challenges amid precarious security conditions, increasing fuel and transport costs and bureaucratic impediments. While humanitarian partners plan to support food insecure people under the Humanitarian Needs Response Plan (HNRP) during 2024, this will be challenging in the current context given the lack of sustained access to the most directly conflict-affected households in contested areas. Assistance is most likely to be maintained in parts of government-controlled eastern and northern Sudan. However, the likelihood of assistance reaching the populations in the Darfur, Kordofan and Khartoum is anticipated to be extremely constrained during the projection period unless there are major breakthroughs in peace negotiations which that would drastically improve humanitarian access.

Remittances: The difficult economic circumstances confronting the contributing family members, along with the prolonged conflict, are hindering the prompt provision of remittances. Despite these challenges, there is an expectation that remittances will likely persist.

Fuel supply: Conflict has severely impacted the functionality of and onward distribution from the Khartoum and El Obeid refineries, as well as negatively impacted other oil infrastructure and led to the destruction of some parts of the electricity distribution network and severe challenges to maintenance. Severely reduced availability of electricity has led to increased demand for imported fuel at a time when market systems, especially major transportation corridors from Port Sudan to western Sudan, are highly disrupted or impassable.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PROJECTION UPDATE SITUATION OVERVIEW AND KEY DRIVERS (OCTOBER 2023 – FEBRUARY 2024)

FOCUS ON REGIONS ANALYSED AND OVERVIEW OF FACTORS THAT APPLY ACROSS ALL AREAS OF ANALYSIS

GREATER DARFUR REGION

Acute food insecurity throughout greater Darfur will be worse than previously projected in the June 2023 second projection analysis due to conflict and organized violence, intercommunal clashes, displacement, economic crisis and reduced agricultural production.

In Central Darfur State, about 929,000 people (49 percent of the population analysed) are facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), with about 316,000 people (17 percent of the population) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 613,000 people (32 percent of the population) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). This marks an increase from the 39 percent in Phase or above during the second projection in the previous analysis. Three localities are classified in Phase 4 (Zalingi 60 percent, Azum 55 percent, Um Dukhun 45 percent) while the remaining six localities are classified in Phase 3 (Shamal, Gharb and Wasat Jabal Marra, Bendasi, Mukjar and Wadi Salih).

The food security situation in West Darfur has significantly deteriorated due to the impacts of conflict and other organized violence, compounded by massive displacement, crop pests and diseases and disruption in trade and macro-economics. An estimated 1.1 million people (60 percent of the population of West Darfur) are facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). This includes about 410,000 people (22 percent of the population of West Darfur) classified in Phase 4 and 721,000 people (38 percent of the population of West Darfur) classified in Phase 3. While Habila, Beida, Kulbus and Foro Baranga have continued to be in Phase 3, persistent shocks have driven the upsurge of the population above Phase 3 in most of these localities. Of all the eight localities, Ag Geneina, Jebel Moon, Kereneik and Sirba are classified in Phase 4 in the updated projection period. Given that over 161,415 people have been assisted in Geneina locality between August and November 2023, the provision of humanitarian assistance has provided a critical cushion in a dire food section situation. The ability to assist these communities has been contingent on the functionality of the Chad corridor which has enabled the movement of aid from Adre in Chad across the border to Geneina. This corridor will also be critical in reaching other parts of West and Central Darfur, such as Zalingei. If the security situation worsens so that the movement of commodities is restricted, including humanitarian assistance, this will have severe implications on food insecure communities, with populations classified in Phase 4 likely to shift into IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe).

In South Darfur, the combined effects of conflict and other organized violence and subsequent displacement, particularly in Nyala city and the surrounding areas, macroeconomic deterioration and limited humanitarian assistance have significantly affected peoples' access to food. About 1.7 million people (44 percent of the population of South Darfur) are facing high levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), with about 550,000 people (14 percent of the population) in Phase 4 and 1.2 million people (30 percent of the population) in Phase 3. Given these circumstances, Beliel, Buram and Mershing locality have been re-classified from Phase 3 to Phase 4 in the second projection period, with 20 percent of the population in Phase 4. In addition, Nyala Jaboub, Nyala Shamal and Sharg aj jabal continue to be classified in Phase 4, with the first two localities having an additional shift of 5 percent of the population from Phase 3 to Phase 4 due to the escalation of violence. The remaining localities continue to be classified in Phase 3, with minor shifts of 5 percent from lower phases (Phase 1 and 2) to higher phases (Phase 3 and 4). In 14 of 17 localities, 5 percent of the population was shifted from lower phases into Phase 4.

In East Darfur, there has been a large influx of IDPs into the state in August-September 2023, after the previous June analysis. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) estimates that 536,680 IDPs have arrived in East Darfur state as of November 2023, which previously had an estimated population of under 1.2 million. Roughly one fifth of these new arrivals have been in the state capital of El Daein, leading to a rapid population increase of about 70 percent over two months. Large concentrations of new arrivals are also reported in the predominantly agricultural localities of Yassin and Shia'ria. About 551,000 people (47 percent of the East Darfur population) are in Phase 3 or above which comprises 143,000 (12 percent of the population) in Phase 4 and 408,000 people (35 percent of the population) in Phase 3. All nine localities in East Darfur are classified in Phase 3.

An estimated 966,000 people (38 percent of the population) in North Darfur are facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). This includes 313,000 people (12 percent of the population) in Phase 4 and 653,000 people (26 percent of the population) in Phase 3. Al Fasher and Um Kadadah are classified in Phase 4 while the remaining localities



are classified in Phase 3. Following reports of significant armed actor redeployments and the fall of the settlement of Um Kadadah, the capital of North Darfur State, El Fasher, is likely to see new and intense organized violence as armed actor control is directly and strongly challenged.

GREATER KORDOFAN REGION

Ongoing conflicts persist in the broader Kordofan region, involving clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as well as other armed actor attacks on SAF in South and West Kordofan, including El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan. This conflict is likely to persist at current levels, with a risk of escalation. Greater Kordofan has experienced an influx of 255,833 displaced individuals in October 2023, representing 4 percent of the total population. El Obeid, a crucial intersection for east-west roads, faces the risk of organized violence posing a major hindrance to civilian traffic, including the transportation of essential food supplies and fuel. Furthermore, a persistent threat of conflict remains between pastoralists and farmers, driven by livestock grazing on agricultural lands.

Approximately 2.68 million people (44 percent) of the analyzed population in the region would be in IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse). This includes 853,000 people (14 percent of the analyzed population) in Phase 4. This challenging scenario is particularly evident in 10 localities: Sheikan in North Kordofan, Al buram, Al quoz, Ar reif ash shargi, Dilling, and Kadugli in South Kordofan, and Abu zabad, Abyei, Al lagowa, and Keilak in West Kordofan. South Kordofan bears a significant burden, with an estimated population in Phase 3 or above reaching 994,000 people (48 percent of the affected population in Greater Kordofan). The situation in Greater Kordofan has worsened due to the impact of conflict on crop production during the current seasons of 2023–2024. Production is expected to fall below the five-year average because the ongoing conflict has disrupted access to finance and inputs, along with challenges like low rainfall, displacement and limited farm access. Access to food is also hampered by increased prices of both food and non-food items, a decrease in purchasing power, and rising transportation costs due to higher fuel prices. The destruction of the industrial sector in Khartoum, where over 80 percent of factories are located, has led to a severe shortage in the supply of goods to other regions of Sudan. Although some food items are imported from neighboring countries like Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda through South Sudan, the high costs make them unaffordable for the majority of the population in Sudan, who have limited purchasing power due to a lack of income and income sources.

The situation in Greater Kordofan is influenced by several factors, including conflict, the presence of internally displaced persons (IDPs), uneven rainfall distribution, disruptions in the supply chain, and high prices for both food and non-food items in the market. Among those most significantly impacted are IDPs lacking a source of income, government employees who received partial salaries, agricultural labourers, farmers and pastoralists. The ongoing conflict has created insecurity, leading to restricted movement, particularly affecting these vulnerable groups.

KHARTOUM STATE

The food security situation in Khartoum state was directly affected by the ongoing SAF-RSF conflict, leading to serious deterioration in the food insecurity in all seven localities of the state. There has been a high level of looting and destruction of food processing factories, markets, food stores and warehouses as well as households' food stocks. The tri-city area, including Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman continues to see heavy fighting, including battles, artillery, indiscriminate use of indirect fire and other forms of violence that have resulted in the displacement of about 3.4 million people (68 percent of all IDPs nationally). The state previously had a high concentration of public sector employees, who now face severe delays in or cessation of salary payments. About 55 percent of the total population are in Phase 3 or above, including 17 percent Phase 4 and 38 percent in Phase 3.

The updated projection scenario of October 2023 to February 2024 for Khartoum State is based on assumptions developed by the analysis team depending on the most likely scenario. Khartoum – the capital of Sudan – is currently the center of the recent conflict in Sudan between the SAF, and the paramilitary Melicia, RSF over control of power in the country. Khartoum state is now an active conflict zone experiencing heavy fighting, clashes, artillery fire, and air raids and other atrocities since the 15th of April 2023. The conflict has internally displaced 5.1 million people, out of which 67.76 percent are from Khartoum State. The conflict has caused a humanitarian crisis and numerous emergencies throughout the state.

The conflict resulted in large scale displacement to the other safe states, hosted by the local communities. Active hostilities, military operations, political instability and impeding relief activities are expected to continue during the projection

period. It is worth mentioning that active conflict and related insecurity/ restricted movement are the main access impediment to relief/ humanitarian assistance operations in Sudan as a whole and Khartoum in particular. The overall security situation in Khartoum State remains tense and volatile. It negatively affected the activities of all government, private sector and humanitarian agencies.

People who chose to stay in the state are facing difficulties in food availability and access due to limited supply/ poor harvest, disruption of the supply chain, low income and poor purchasing power. Households who remain in Khartoum are vulnerable to indiscriminate shelling and a shortage of food, clean water and health care. Those who remained are the vulnerable households who can't afford the cost of travel. Collapse of the health system left people deprived of lifesaving health care services/medicines, especially those with chronic diseases and the new emergencies/casualties due to the conflict. Households are unable to access food which is the extreme limiting factor.

Tuti island within Khartoum locality and potentially al Fatihab neighborhood in southern Omdurman are of particular concern for high levels of food insecurity. This is as a result of conflict which significantly restricted civilian movement, including exit from these areas.

The expected harvest from the production areas in the state is likely to push the cereal prices to decline seasonally, but at lower rates compared to normal; this is expected to improve the availability and accessibility compared to the lean season but will remain worse than the typical situation during the harvest period.

Bahri, Um. Durman, Um Bada and Khartoum localities are classified as Phase 4 in the projection with 55 percent of population from Bahri and Um durman in Phase 3 or above and 60 percent in Khartoum and Um bada.

Jebel Awlia, Karrari, and Sharg Elnil localities are classified as IPC phase 3 (Crisis) with 50 percent of the population from Jebel Awlia and Sharg Enile in Crisis situation or worse and 55 percent of the population from Karrari in Phase 3 or above. This is due to the consequences of the ongoing conflict which affected the ability of the people to produce and/ or access food and other basic services leading to massive displacement and loss of livelihoods and productive assets. The majority of Khartoum population were displaced either internally to other safer states or to the neighbouring countries (mostly to Egypt, Chad, South Sudan and other countries).

Effects of the conflict in Khartoum:

- Armed clashes since mid-April 2023 have impacted the major urban centers in Khartoum State, including the destruction of some of the country's critical essential infrastructure in those towns including hospitals/ health centers, power supply stations, water treatment facilities, telecommunications HQs, financial institutions, markets and physical infrastructure such as bridges.
- The eastern and northern parts of the country have been relatively spared, and hundreds of thousands of people fled Khartoum State to Wad Medani, Kassala, Gedaref, Port Sudan and Ad Damar or Dongola towns in the North.
- Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri were epicenters of the conflict, with the population (and aid workers) being caught in the crossfire against a backdrop of extremely limited humanitarian access.
- This has taken place amidst frequent power cuts, lack of access to essential services and the full disruption of livelihoods and access to markets and products of necessity.
- In various parts of Khartoum, health facilities have been affected leading to limited health care services and shortage of medical supplies.
- In addition, the conflict has prompted the interruption of critical social services such as power and water supply, markets functionality, escalating food prices and limited mobile networks. All these contributing factors resulted in classifying 55 percent of the population in Phase 3 and 4.

AL GEZIRA STATE

Gezira state has been classified in Phase 3 on the updated projection (October 2023 – February 2024), with all the localities in Phase 3. The number of populations in Phase 3 or above is estimated to be 1,87 million, representing 31 percent of the total population in need of urgent action to save life and protect their livelihoods. From these, approximately 418,000 people are in Phase 4 (7 percent of the population analysed). The northern localities of the state have been most recently affected by conflict, with a growing risk for the remainder of the state.



Populations in Phase 3 or above are distributed all over the state, with relatively high percentages in Al Kamlin (50 percent of the population in Phase 3 or above), Al Hasahisa and Um- Algura (35 percent) while the rest of localities fall between 20 – 25 percent. Those are people who have no staple income source, IDPs who lost their income sources, some IDP host households, poor households headed by women and small farmers who faced lost production in the current season. Those with low job opportunities and diseases (cholera and dengue fever) are also included, as well as vulnerability created by the ongoing-conflict and related assets losses. Due to the ongoing conflict, IDPs and refugees fled to the state. They left their homes, the majority of them lost their assets, jobs and food stocks. Some IDPs live in gathering points without shelters and insufficient food, others are hosted by communities and in shared houses – sharing food with relatives. This puts further burden on households. The high number of IDPs cause more stress on health services, water and electricity supplies and salaried workers who only received part of their salaries.

OVERVIEW OF FACTORS THAT APPLY ACROSS ALL AREAS OF ANALYSIS

Conflict and Organized Violence Overview

Organized violence remains the main driver of acute food insecurity and a heightened risk of extreme food insecurity in Sudan, primarily through the conflict between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Subnational and local organized violence is also driving acute food insecurity in multiple areas. While Khartoum State, Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur – especially urban areas within them – continue to be major hotspots, organized violence is not limited to these areas or to the RSF-SAF conflict. As of the analysis workshop in mid-November 2023, organized violence was occurring more frequently and at a higher intensity than was projected for the October 2023-February 2024 period during the previous June 2023 analysis. The current overall conflict situation will most likely continue through the projection period.

Although the revival of the Jeddah talks is a positive development, a negotiated settlement of the conflict between the RSF and SAF is not likely within the projection period given the continued battlefield success of one major armed actor involved in the talks. Intermittent national and localized pauses in organized violence, whether formal or informal, remain likely to occur. Although considered unlikely within the projection period, any negotiated, large-scale and sustained ceasefire within or cessation of the RSF-SAF conflict would likely have immediate positive impacts on food security and other humanitarian outcomes. Other organized violence would likely continue, however, including in Greater Darfur.

Given its strategic importance, organized violence within the tri-city area, covering Khartoum, Khartoum Bahri and Omdurman, is highly likely to continue at levels at least comparable to the preceding three months. Key locations for organized violence will continue to include major infrastructure and the areas around them, especially intact Nile bridges.

The risk that essential infrastructure may be damaged, destroyed or otherwise rendered unusable for civilians remains high, as seen with the reported destruction of the Shambat bridge during the analysis workshop and of the Jebel Awlia dam drawbridge immediately after the analysis workshop. The loss of additional Nile bridges and other critical transportation infrastructure would further complicate the east to west flow of civilian traffic, including commercial goods and humanitarian assistance. Major agricultural areas and riverine settlements with major infrastructure, like intact Nile bridges, are at the greatest risk given their strategic value, both as an asset to be taken and as an asset to deny another armed actor.

Additionally, while much of the civilian population has already left the tri-city area, remaining civilians are likely to continue to experience severe movement restrictions, indiscriminate use of indirect fire and reduced access to their livelihoods, as well as markets and humanitarian assistance. Some public reporting after the analysis workshop suggested greater restrictions on civilian movement in at least some parts of the tri-city area. This includes potentially extreme restrictions for civilians still residing in the Al Fatihab neighborhood of southern Omdurman, which is adjacent to a contested, intact White Nile bridge and other strategic sites.

Organized violence throughout greater Darfur, including West, Central, South and North Darfur states, is likely to increase following reported changes in territorial control between two large armed actors and the likely reallocation of fighters that this shift enables. Nyala – the capital of South Darfur State, Zalingei – the capital of Central Darfur State, and El Gineina – the capital of West Darfur reportedly experienced major organized violence, with the targeting of civilians continuing throughout El Gineina locality. The entire locality of El Gineina remains an area of high concern for high levels of food insecurity.

There are severe and likely growing challenges to civilian mobility in the city of El Fasher – the capital of North Darfur State – and its environs following reports of significant armed actor redeployments and the fall of the settlement of Um Kadadah in North Darfur State. This was not previously projected in the June 2023 analysis. The city is at a heightened risk of new and intense organized violence through the projection period. Multiple scenarios for the city were considered, with major organized violence within the city and a siege considered risk factors to monitor. A largely nonviolent shift in control of the city was considered an unlikely scenario, but one that would lead to a more positive food security situation than projected.

Organized violence targeting civilians and their means of survival by a wide range of armed actors is likely to remain frequent and intense throughout greater Darfur, especially West Darfur State. This is not only due to RSF-SAF conflict, but also a broader mix of armed actors, highly varied in size, capabilities, and goals – using organized violence in pursuit of subnational and local political objectives.

Following the analysis workshop, there were new signs that multiple armed actors may become active or increase their involvement in organized violence. These recent developments also raise the risk of armed actors targeting civilians more broadly in several areas of greater Darfur, including North and Central Darfur states, based on social vulnerabilities.

Although displacement out of some of the worst-affected areas in greater Darfur, especially West Darfur State, has been and is projected to remain high, there is a risk that civilian mobility could become extremely constrained due to the use and threat of organized violence within the projection period. Were this to occur – such as in an urban area and/or camp for long-term IDPs – then acute food insecurity would likely intensify severely among immobilized populations.

Organized violence in greater Kordofan, particularly the South and West Kordofan states and the city of El Obeid (the capital of North Kordofan State) is likely to at least continue around current levels, with a risk of intensification. El Obeid is a major crossroads for primary east-west roads, including for military, commercial and humanitarian traffic. This is likely to be a major impediment to civilian traffic, including the movement of staple food commodities, fuel and humanitarian assistance.


South Kordofan State will likely continue to see armed actor efforts to increase territorial control, as occurred since the June 2023 analysis. These shifts, involving organized violence around and within Dilling and Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan State, were not previously projected in the June 2023 analysis. These trends are likely to continue negatively impacting food security through the projection period.

Sieges, including partial or complete encirclement of urban and other areas, or sections of them, remain likely in multiple locations through the projection period. The permeability of these sieges may vary widely depending on armed actor objectives. Civilians immobilized by the use and threat of organized violence, including in combination with environmental and other barriers to movement, such as desert or water bodies, alongside continued disruption to agricultural and livestock production, market systems, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, are at greatest risk of severe and extreme food insecurity. Some sections of the tri-city area are of particular concern, as well as several at-risk areas across Greater Darfur, particularly West and North Darfur.

Displacement overview

Since the outbreak of conflict, over one million individuals have sought refuge in neighboring countries, with Chad receiving the largest influx (39 percent), followed by South Sudan (29 percent), Egypt (24 percent), Ethiopia (7 percent), the Central African Republic (2 percent), and Libya (<1 percent). Among these, 64 percent are Sudanese nationals. The count of IDPs has almost doubled since the initiation of the conflict in Sudan, as per the most recent data from the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). The most recent estimate reveals that 5,090,869 individuals have been internally displaced. The displaced population is dispersed across 5,473 locations throughout all 18 states of Sudan.

Being close to Khartoum, where ongoing conflict continues,



with significant concentrations of IDPs are also observed in South Darfur (12.28 percent), River Nile (11.99 percent), East Darfur (10.59 percent), White Nile (8.32 percent), North Darfur (8.31 percent), and Northern (7.09 percent).

The IDPs predominantly come from eight states, with the majority, accounting for 66.85 percent (3,403,481 IDPs), have been displaced from Khartoum state. Other states with substantial IDP populations include South Darfur (15.61 percent), North Darfur (8.87 percent), Central Darfur (3.8 percent), West Darfur (3.65 percent), South Kordofan (0.69 percent), North Kordofan (0.52 percent), and Aj Jazirah (0.01 percent). Non-Sudanese nationals make up approximately 2.39 percent of the IDP caseload.

Agricultural production performance

The performance of the 2023 main agricultural season in the country has been tangled with many challenges. According to FAO assessment findings [FAO, Nov. 2023], the main season’s planted area has been reduced by 15 percent compared to the five years’ average in size. However, the estimated production of the main staple cereal of Sorghum and Millet is estimated to be lower by 24 percent and 50 percent respectively compared to the previous season. The key factors that have considerably affected the agricultural performance, included uneven distribution of the season’s rainfall with several dry-spells being reported in many states, incidence of plant pest and diseases, low availability and high cost/price of agricultural inputs, shortage of finance to farmers, poor extension services, very fragile security environment, limitations of mobility and constraints along supply chains due to conflict and insecurity, cases of conflicts along migratory routes among others.


Although average livestock body condition was observed and reportedly, availability of pasture/feed and water were considered of concern. Livestock health conditions were worrisome due to lack of or very limited availability and access to livestock vaccination and treatment possibilities. Additionally, key challenges encountered and affecting livestock sub-sector include very high production input prices, conflicts between herders and farmers, blockade of livestock migratory routes, limited availability and access to pasture and water among others.

The prevailing conflict and insecurity have limited access to agricultural financial resources as a result of disruptions of the banking services. Prices of agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, insecticides, herbicides, fuel, and spare parts for machineries were high. Farmers were displaced in conflict hot-spot areas by abandoning their agricultural fields and some lost their agricultural assets. In some states, technical institutions responsible for agriculture were dismantled. Instability has restricted movement of farmers, agricultural extension workers, and animal health workers. Hence, the multi-dimensional impact of conflict has worsened the ever-deteriorating household food security situation.

Market price and trend

Food access:



Macroeconomic: Sudan’s primary economic pillars include agriculture, animal breeding, trade and employment. The ongoing conflict in Khartoum has exerted a substantial impact on the nation’s economy. Persistent intense urban conflict, particularly in key trade and commerce centers and along primary routes, is foreseen to continue significantly hampering business operations. This disruption is expected to interrupt salary payments, diminish consumer activity, disrupt both food and non-food supply chains, and lead to an economic contraction, thereby reducing purchasing power. Unfortunately, the conflict has spread widely across most of Greater Darfur and some localities in Greater Kordofan. Despite attempts by some banks to establish branches in secure regions, operational challenges persist in conflict areas, limiting household access to cash and causing disruptions in the banking sector. Efforts to address fiscal and balance of payments deficits are underway to mitigate inflation.



Exchange rate: The national currency is currently experiencing rapid depreciation, driven by increased demand for foreign currency due to partially functioning imports and trades, as well as heightened demands from individuals who have

fled the country. In October, the average foreign exchange rate experienced a substantial devaluation of 14.3 percent, dropping to approximately 960 Sudanese Pounds per 1 US Dollar, compared to the September 2023 rate of 800 SDG/1 US Dollar. The shortage of hard currency, exacerbated by export disruptions due to the ongoing conflict, contributes to this depreciation trend. Without a cessation of conflict and the restoration of economic activities and trade, the currency is anticipated to undergo further sharp depreciation, as observed in the past three months. This depreciation is expected to drive up the prices of imported goods nationwide.

Staple food prices: The widespread destruction and disruption of crucial markets and transportation routes in Sudan, as well as with neighboring countries, are anticipated to persist, resulting in irregular deliveries, constrained quantities and varieties, and a further surge in food prices in the upcoming months. Given the expected reduction in harvests due



to the conflict’s impact on crop production, post-harvest period prices are likely to deviate significantly from the norm. Projections indicate that staple grain prices could rise by approximately 200 percent above the five-year average and 50-100 percent higher than the previous year during the forecasted period. Access to essential food commodities in Sudan is expected to remain restricted due to persistently high prices, diminished purchasing power, and limited cash availability.

Factors impacting cereal prices: The heightened transportation costs, stemming from fuel shortages and levies imposed by the RSF on certain roads connecting Khartoum and Kosti to the Kordofan and Darfur regions, as well as interconnecting these states, pose a significant challenge. The risks associated with traversing insecure routes further contribute to an increase in cereal prices. Additionally, all related expenses incurred along this route are incorporated into the consumer price, accompanied by an abnormal profit margin.

On a national scale, the above-average production in the 22/23 season, amounting to 7.4 million tonnes, brought about a modest stabilization in cereal prices compared to the previous year. However, Sorghum prices remained comparable to last year due to low demand for cross-border trade, disruptions in value chains, and the escalation of transportation costs. In October, the national average Sorghum prices witnessed a 25 percent increase compared to the pre-conflict March levels and a remarkable 223 percent surge above the last five years’ average. National Millet prices, on the other hand, exhibited a 7 percent decrease from the previous year. However, they increased by 37 percent compared to March before the onset of the conflict and soared by 199 percent above the last five years’ average. Wheat flour prices experienced a 50 percent rise compared to the previous year and a substantial 161 percent increase over the last three years’ average. Furthermore, between March and October, wheat flour prices surged by 52 percent.

Livestock prices: Despite ongoing market disruptions caused by the persistent conflict and insecurity along primary and secondary routes across the country and in key supply areas, there has been a slight increase or stabilization in livestock prices across all markets. This unseasonal trend is attributed to the challenges posed by the prevailing conflict and insecurity. The expectation is that livestock prices will remain stable throughout the scenario period, driven by disruptions in both market dynamics and the livestock supply and export chains. Notably, prices have shown stability with a slight increment observed between June and October 2023. During this period, households are anticipated to sell additional livestock to generate income, addressing the financial challenges posed by the projected significantly above-average food prices.

Trade routes: As per the FEWSNET trading routes map, Sudan’s northeastern regions are currently experiencing delays in both market and transportation route due to a combination of roadblocks, politicization, financial exploitation, increased

checkpoints, and bureaucratic hurdles, which is negatively affecting trade dynamics. The situation is particularly dire in the southwestern regions, notably in Darfur, where markets are severely disrupted. Urgent market operations are required to exert influence over the flow of commodities entering these states or to facilitate the trade of locally produced goods that are currently not reaching other regions.

Fuel supply: Conflict and the obstruction of trade routes have significantly impacted the essential commodity of fuel supply to states and communities from the major refinery. The consequences of this crisis extend to various sectors, including transportation, agricultural production, electric power generators, and the overall economy. The combination of limited fuel supply and escalating prices exacerbates challenges across these critical areas, creating a multifaceted impact on the affected regions and communities.

Staple food price projection: The ongoing extensive destruction and disruption of vital markets and transportation corridors in Sudan and neighboring countries are expected to persist, resulting in sporadic deliveries, limited quantities, and a constrained variety of food items. This situation is likely to drive food prices even higher in the upcoming months. Foreseeing a diminished harvest due to the impact of the conflict on crops, prices are expected to remain unusually high in the post-harvest period.

The combination of reduced income opportunities, limited cash availability, and insecurity affecting access is anticipated to dampen market demand. Access to essential staple food items in Sudan will continue to be restricted by significantly high prices, diminished purchasing power, and limited cash availability but receiving remittances will maintain access to cash and food to some extent. The heightened transportation costs, stemming from fuel scarcity or levies and royalties imposed by the RSF on roads connecting various markets to Khartoum, Kosti, Kordofan, and Darfur regions, along with the associated risks of traveling through insecure routes, are poised to further contribute to an escalation in cereal prices.

Nutrition situation overview

Overall, children less than five years admitted with severe wasting was higher in 2023 compared to 2022 based on the admission reports three months preceding the conflict in April 2023. Severe wasting admissions escalated with the onset of the conflict in majority of the states peaking in the months of June, July, and August 2023. This depicts serious inadequacies in the diets and disease outbreaks and limited supplies in the functioning health facilities in the preceding months and additional pressure by IDPs on limited resources. Aljazira and River Nile states (non-conflict areas) recorded a very steep progressive increase in severe malnutrition from the month of May through to September 2023. Other states with current active conflict such as Central and West Darfur, Khartoum and South Kordofan have generally recorded very low admissions of acute malnutrition that could be related to challenges with access to health facilities, dysfunctional facilities, stock outs due to broken pipeline for commodities and wide displacements related to the insecurity experienced in the states. Given that the accessible states are having record high admissions with wasting, there is high likelihood that the situation could be worse in the active conflict states.

Based on program data from the health facilities, relatively peaceful states such as Gedaref reported continuously increasing trend with additional 1000 children less than 5 years admitted per month in May- August 2023. The increasing trend in the state depicts worsening nutrition and associated factors situation in the state and acute malnutrition among children less than 5 years that could be related to influx of IDPs from the active conflict states that stretch the resources both in the community and health facilities. This shows that the states that have less conflict equally have high vulnerability to malnutrition that is highly associated to impact of the conflict in other states such as Khartoum, Kordofan and Darfur that are experiencing active conflict.

The contributing factors to acute malnutrition observed in the high admissions of malnourished children are inadequate dietary intake, reduced humanitarian support with medical and nutrition commodities, dysfunctional health facilities, high disease burden (diarrhea, ARI, and fever), and disease outbreaks (measles, cholera, and acute watery diarrhea), limited access to safe water and water contamination due to poor human waste disposal, that when coupled with deteriorating food insecurity worsen the malnutrition situation in Sudan. There is an urgent need to address the health and nutrition situation in children less than 5 years old alongside food security to save lives in Sudan.



THE ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN FOOD ASSISTANCE

Access to people in need is one of the greatest challenges facing by humanitarian partners and stakeholders in Sudan, which has become one of the most difficult humanitarian operational environments in the world today. The conflict dynamics have become increasingly complex, making it challenging for humanitarian partners to deliver lifesaving and life-sustaining assistance to people trapped in conflict hotspots, like Khartoum, the Kordofans, and the Darfurs states, where aid is needed most urgently. Despite all the challenges, FSL humanitarian partners continue to plan to provide life-saving food and emergency livelihoods assistance to conflict affected population and IDPs.

Since the outbreak of the conflict on 15th April and up to 30th October, Food Security and Livelihood (FSL) sector has reached overall 8.92 million people with life-saving food and emergency livelihoods assistance. The FSL response covered 154 localities in 18 states with 3.3 million beneficiaries provided with food and 5.62 million beneficiaries provided with emergency livelihoods assistance.

However, the provision of humanitarian assistance has been constrained by insecurity. Aid convoys face threats, roadblocks, politicization, financial exploitation, increased checkpoints, and bureaucratic hurdles, navigating across conflict parties with different agendas and interests. In addition, humanitarian food has been looted, cash and fuel misappropriated, vehicles and office equipment damaged or stolen, and offices and premises of humanitarian stakeholders partially burned and damaged. Insecurity along critical transportation corridors, which is critical for reaching the Kordofans and the Darfurs, commercial transporters fearing or refusing to enter conflict hotspots, along with forced escorts and taxations have made the provision of assistance difficult. While a humanitarian corridor between Chad and West Darfur has been established, large parts of Darfur remain inaccessible. Intensified airstrikes and shelling in Khartoum have rendered safe access nearly impossible.


In addition to insecurity, humanitarian partners reported that electricity and communication outages, fuel shortages, and disruptions to the banking systems are undermining efforts to deliver assistance. The difficulty in establishing any regularity or consistency both geographically and temporally will limit the extent to which assistance can contribute to reducing food insecurity and prevent worse outcomes.

The provision of humanitarian food assistance will continue to face considerable challenges amid precarious security conditions, increasing fuel and transport costs, and bureaucratic impediments. While humanitarian partners plan to support food insecure people under the Humanitarian Needs Response Plan (HNRP) during 2024, this will be challenging in the current context given the lack of sustained access to the most directly conflict-affected households in contested areas. Assistance is most likely to be maintained in parts of government-controlled eastern and northern Sudan including Gadarif, Al Jazirah, Kassala, and White Nile. However, the likelihood of assistance reaching the populations in the Darfurs, Kordofans and Khartoum is anticipated to be extremely constrained during the projection period unless there are major breakthroughs in peace negotiations that would drastically improve humanitarian access.

COMPARISON WITH THE PREVIOUS ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND PROJECTION


In the past four years, Sudan has experienced a situation where the population in Phase 3 and above (Crisis or worse) constituted more than 15 percent of the total population. Levels of food insecurity are likely to keep rising as a result of protracted conflicts, political instability, deteriorating macroeconomic environment, and below average harvest.

The second projection period corresponds to the pre-harvest and harvest phase from October 2023 to February 2024. As indicated in the June 2023 analysis, it was expected that the food security situation would see a modest improvement during this period compared to the peak lean season of July to September 2023 due to improved food availability from the harvest. However, the projection update analysis in November 2023 aligns partially with the assumptions made for the most probable scenarios through February 2024. The only deviation relates to unforeseen consequences stemming from increased conflict, displacements, flooding, and a macroeconomic crisis persisting at levels exceeding expectations.



Compared to the June 2023 second projection analysis, around 1.7 million (4 percent) of the population has shifted from Phase 1 to Phase 2, while the estimated populations in Phase 3 or above increased from 15.0 million people (31 percent) to 17.7 million people (37 percent). This signifies a 6 percent rise compared to the previous June analysis. There has been a 4 percent increase in populations in Phase 3 and a 2 percent increase in those in Phase 4. Moreover, the heightened conflicts underscore the need for immediate intervention to prevent a further worsening in the food security situation.

In the most recent update, seven localities have shifted from Phase 2 to Phase 3, with North Darfur contributing four localities, North Kordofan two, and Al Jazeera one. The country is grappling with ongoing conflict, intensified by heightened El Niño effects resulting in floods that impact the post-harvest process and storage of harvested food. Consequently, approximately 25 localities have witnessed further deterioration from Phase 3 to Phase 4. This decline is predominantly attributed to the ongoing challenges posed by conflict and environmental factors.



RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

Response Priorities

Humanitarian assistance and life-saving activities

- Provision of life-saving food or cash assistance to populations facing crisis and emergency levels of food insecurity, including residents, newly displaced and protracted IDPs and refugees.
- Provision of critical non-food assistance to populations facing crisis and emergency levels of food insecurity, including residents, newly displaced and protracted IDPs and refugees.
- Provision of cash and voucher assistance in areas where markets and supply chains are functioning to improve access to cash which remains at low availability, thereby improving market access.
- Ensure prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition in emergency and recovery situations through integrated package of nutrition specific and nutrition sensitive activities to improve the immediate food security and nutritional well-being, with integration of behavioral change capacity programmes, sanitation, clean water, and health services developments.
- Scale-up of provision of school meals to improve food security of children and enhance children's access to education through improved school enrolment, retention, and attendance in schools.
- Expand social protection programmes through conditional, unconditional, and multipurpose cash transfer modalities, with transfer values revised in line with market price trends, to address the rising levels of poverty, vulnerability as well as humanitarian needs.
- Provision time critical emergency agricultural inputs, livestock and fishery supplies and veterinary services.
- Provision of time-critical emergency livelihood and social protection support through cash and in-kind transfers

Food production, resilience building, and livelihood restoring/protection support interventions:

- Provide essential life-sustaining agricultural livelihood support, including a broad range of agriculture and livelihood restoring and safeguarding support packages to vulnerable people according to the seasonal calendar of interventions.
- Create sustainable and stable livelihood opportunities, particularly for the most vulnerable groups such as women, through schemes that promote the creation, building or rehabilitation of assets that improve long-term food security and resilience.
- Improve agricultural production and productivity by supporting the availability of financial services (through the Agricultural Bank of Sudan) and agricultural inputs (such as training, tools, seeds, fertilizers etc.) to small scale producers which will promote productivity, generate new employment as well as strengthen food availability and help mitigate the impact of below average harvests.
- Reduce post-harvest food loss through initiatives that address the structural lack of storage capacities such as hermetic storage technologies facilities (including hermetic storage bags and silos) to store crops, along with trainings in post-harvest handling, aggregation, storage, value addition, food quality and linkages to markets among smallholder farmers, which can increase incomes for farmers and improve food security.
- Strengthen the Early Warning systems, including in relation to floods and droughts, to monitor key factors affecting food security.

Food security, nutrition, and livelihoods data and information

- Ensure food security, nutrition and livelihood data is collected at the household level in as many localities as possible, including accessible and access-constrained states, either through face-to-face or remote data collection modalities.
- Produce and disseminate timely, credible, and accurate food security, nutrition, and agricultural livelihoods evidence for informed decision-making and action by a wide range of actors, stakeholders, and partners.
- Strengthen vertical and horizontal coordination among food security, nutrition, and livelihoods partners, stakeholders, and actors at locality, state, and national levels.
- Strengthen evidence-based knowledge and learning generation from the implementation and results of emergency response and resilience interventions for replication.

Risk Factors to Monitor

Organized violence may occur at greater frequency, intensity, and/or affect different populations, than currently projected, leading to acute food insecurity at greater severity and/or magnitude than currently projected. Organized violence may also affect other outcomes in more severe ways or in different areas than projected. These risk factors to monitor include, but are not limited to:

- **Large increases in the frequency, intensity, and/or scope of organized violence**, including intensification of organised violence among a range of armed actors – including through increased targeting of civilians based on social vulnerabilities in North and Central Darfur states – spread to major agricultural areas, and new or increased use of organised violence by additional armed actors, especially in greater Darfur.
- **Large increases in displacement or immobilization**, including the displacement of new populations, further displacement of populations already displaced once or more, and/or the complete or near complete immobilization of populations already experiencing reduced access to agricultural and livestock production, markets, and humanitarian assistance.
- **Significant deterioration in humanitarian access**, such as due to changes in organised violence and the policies of major armed actors, potentially including greater Kordofan, West Darfur State, White Nile State, Gezira State, and other areas.
- **Damage, destruction, or blockage of major infrastructure**, including bridges, dams like Jebel Awlia, and oil pipelines and installations, with the inhibition of oil exports severely affecting Sudan as well as South Sudan.
- **Macro-economic issues and price shocks.**
- **Agriculture season performance.**
- **Market functionality and prices trends.**
- **Climate shocks and hazards.**
- **Pest and disease including desert locust.**
- **Nutrition situation monitoring.**
- **Water sanitation and Health monitoring.**

PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

This analysis update was organized by the Federal Technical Working Group, with the support of the IPC Global Support Unit (GSU), which updated the second projection of the IPC analysis done in July 2023 covering the period from October 2023 to February 2024. The update focused on 10 out of 18 states: East Darfur, North Darfur, West Darfur, Central Darfur, South Darfur, North Kordofan, West Kordofan, South Kordofan, Khartoum, and Al Jazira. The selection of these states was based on the severity of the impacts of the ongoing conflict and the likelihood of a deviation from the assumptions made in the previous AFI June 2023 analysis.

Given the challenges of ongoing conflict and restricted movement, the IPC TWG and IPC GSU adopted a virtual analysis process. Experienced food security and nutrition analysts facilitated the analysis, and approximately 35 participants participated in the analysis despite internet connectivity challenges. Key participating agencies included WFP, FAO, FEWS NET, USAID, Food Security Cluster, REACH, and Government line ministries.

The projection update analysis took into account the ongoing and dynamic conflict. Due to the fluid nature of the conflict, the core team revisited the analysis for Darfur and Khartoum. The classifications were subsequently revised and agreed upon by the analysis team, taking into consideration the ongoing conflict and assistance.

The analysts were grouped by state and primarily collaborated through platforms like WhatsApp, Zoom meetings, and direct calls. The locality-level analysis began on 6 November 2023, followed by state-level vetting in the second week of November, and national consolidation in the third week of November. A final meeting with the Analysis Team was summoned on 28 November to finalise the discussions on areas with highest levels of severity and particularly, the alleged presence of populations in IPC Phase 5.

The analysis was documented using the IPC Information Support System (ISS). The National IPC Technical Working Group worked closely with several groups, which were facilitated by national and GSU experts. All analysts received access to available data through email, WhatsApp, and a shared online drive (Dropbox) for easy access and use.

Data Sources:

- WFP (Humanitarian Food Assistance, Market Information)
- FAO (Geospatial assessment, 2023 Summer Season Performance, Desert Locust Bulletin)
- FEWSNET/ FSTS (Market price monitoring)
- IOM (Displacement Information)
- UNHCR (Refugees Information)
- FSNWG (El-Nino and IOD impacts) SMA (Rainfall Forecast)
- FSTS (2023 Seasonal Performance)
- WHO (Nutrition and Disease Information)
- OCHA (Sudan HRP Access)
- REACH (Cross-border assessments)
- Mercy Corps (Remote Sensing Information)
- Sudan Meteorological Authority (ENSO Forecast)
- Conflict analysis from various partners.

Limitations of the analysis

The ongoing conflict has a negative impact in terms of:

- Absence of some core analysts.
- insecurity in some areas, restricted movement to areas with good internet connections
- Severe challenges in access to adequate telecommunications and electricity including continuous unstable internet connection.
- Severe humanitarian access challenges, including for data collection, in some of the worst-affected locations.

Acute Food Insecurity Phase name and description

Phase 1 None/Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine
Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Households either: • have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or • are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	Households either: • have large food consumption gaps that are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or • are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. For famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)

What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity?

The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of acute food and nutrition crises as well as chronic food insecurity based on international standards. The IPC consists of four mutually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consensus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and comparability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and programming.

For the IPC, Acute Food Insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity.

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Classification of food insecurity and malnutrition was conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Against Hunger, CARE, CILSS, EC-JRC, FAO, FEWSNET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IGAD, Oxfam, PROGRESAN-SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNICEF and WFP.

IPC Analysis Partners:





ANNEX : DETAILED POPULATION TABLE (OCTOBER 2023 - FEBRUARY 2024)

State	Locality	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#	%		#people	%
Aj Jazirah	Al hasahisa	991,563	297,469	30	347,047	35	247,891	25	99,156	10	-	-	3	347,047	35
	Al kamlin	713,796	142,759	20	214,139	30	249,829	35	107,069	15	-	-	3	356,898	50
	Al manaqil	912,056	319,220	35	364,822	40	182,411	20	45,603	5	-	-	3	228,014	25
	Al qurashi	544,288	190,501	35	190,501	35	136,072	25	27,214	5	-	-	3	163,286	30
	Janub aj jazirah	913,139	273,942	30	410,913	45	182,628	20	45,657	5	-	-	3	228,285	25
	Medani al kubra	714,190	285,676	40	249,967	35	142,838	20	35,710	5	-	-	3	178,548	25
	Sharg aj jazirah	761,212	266,424	35	266,424	35	190,303	25	38,061	5	-	-	3	228,364	30
	Um algura	388,461	116,538	30	135,961	35	116,538	30	19,423	5	-	-	3	135,961	35
	Aj Jazirah Total	5,938,705	1,892,529	32	2,179,774	37	1,448,510	24	417,893	7	-	-		1,866,403	31
Blue Nile	Al kurmuk	195,181	39,036	20	97,590	50	39,036	20	19,518	10	-	-	3	58,554	30
	Ar rusayris	278,768	125,445	45	111,507	40	27,876	10	13,938	5	-	-	2	41,814	15
	At tadamon - bn	136,951	68,475	50	47,932	35	13,695	10	6,847	5	-	-	2	20,542	15
	Baw	189,736	56,920	30	85,381	45	37,947	20	9,486	5	-	-	3	47,433	25
	Ed damazine	351,026	175,513	50	122,859	35	35,102	10	17,551	5	-	-	2	52,653	15
	Geisan	154,953	54,233	35	69,728	45	23,242	15	7,747	5	-	-	3	30,989	20
	Wad al mahi	109,618	27,404	25	43,847	40	32,885	30	5,480	5	-	-	3	38,365	35
	Blue Nile Total	1,416,233	547,029	39	578,847	41	209,786	15	80,571	6	-	-		290,357	21
Central Darfur	Azum	139,521	20,928	15	41,856	30	48,832	35	27,904	20	-	-	4	76,736	55
	Bendasi	123,348	24,670	20	43,172	35	37,004	30	18,502	15	-	-	3	55,506	45
	Gharb jabal marrah	267,447	40,117	15	93,606	35	93,606	35	40,117	15	-	-	3	133,723	50
	Mukjar	160,221	32,044	20	56,077	35	48,066	30	24,033	15	-	-	3	72,099	45
	Shamal jabal marrah	214,884	32,233	15	85,954	40	64,465	30	32,233	15	-	-	3	96,698	45
	Um dukhun	175,008	35,002	20	61,253	35	43,752	25	35,002	20	-	-	4	78,754	45
	Wadi salih	347,459	69,492	20	121,611	35	104,238	30	52,119	15	-	-	3	156,357	45
	Wasat jabal marrah	167,781	25,167	15	67,112	40	50,334	30	25,167	15	-	-	3	75,501	45
	Zalingi	306,150	30,615	10	91,845	30	122,460	40	61,230	20	-	-	4	183,690	60
	Central Darfur Total	1,901,819	310,267	16	662,486	35	612,759	32	316,307	17	-	-		929,066	49
East Darfur	Abu jabrah	96,632	19,326	20	28,990	30	38,653	40	9,663	10	-	-	3	48,316	50
	Abu karinka	176,199	35,240	20	61,670	35	61,670	35	17,620	10	-	-	3	79,290	45
	Adila	142,189	28,438	20	42,657	30	56,876	40	14,219	10	-	-	3	71,095	50
	Al firdous	111,196	27,799	25	38,919	35	33,359	30	11,120	10	-	-	3	44,479	40
	Assalaya	139,797	41,939	30	48,929	35	34,949	25	13,980	10	-	-	3	48,929	35
	Bahr al arab	193,942	48,486	25	48,486	25	67,880	35	29,091	15	-	-	3	96,971	50
	El daein	161,289	16,129	10	56,451	35	64,516	40	24,193	15	-	-	3	88,709	55
	Shiaria	81,211	20,303	25	24,363	30	24,363	30	12,182	15	-	-	3	36,545	45
	Yassin	73,659	18,415	25	18,415	25	25,781	35	11,049	15	-	-	3	36,830	50
	East Darfur Total	1,176,114	256,074	22	368,878	31	408,045	35	143,116	12	-	-		551,161	47

Population table (October 2023 - February 2024) continued

State	Locality	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#	%		#people	%
Gedaref	Al butanah	148,673	66,902	45	59,469	40	22,300	15	-	-	-	-	2	22,300	15
	Al fao	375,041	150,016	40	168,768	45	56,256	15	-	-	-	-	2	56,256	15
	Al fashaga	131,271	59,071	45	52,508	40	19,690	15	-	-	-	-	2	19,690	15
	Al galabat al gharbyah - kassab	196,846	68,896	35	88,580	45	39,369	20	-	-	-	-	3	39,369	20
	Al mafaza	131,980	46,193	35	52,792	40	26,396	20	6,599	5	-	-	3	32,995	25
	Al qureisha	164,629	65,851	40	49,388	30	49,388	30	-	-	-	-	3	49,388	30
	Ar rahad	293,428	102,699	35	132,042	45	58,685	20	-	-	-	-	3	58,685	20
	Basundah	109,580	38,353	35	38,353	35	32,874	30	-	-	-	-	3	32,874	30
	Galaa al nahal	143,267	42,980	30	57,306	40	42,980	30	-	-	-	-	3	42,980	30
	Galabat ash-shargiah	242,162	84,756	35	96,864	40	60,540	25	-	-	-	-	3	60,540	25
	Madeinat al gedaref	609,726	274,376	45	243,890	40	91,458	15	-	-	-	-	2	91,458	15
	Wasat al gedaref	242,308	96,923	40	109,038	45	36,346	15	-	-	-	-	2	36,346	15
	Gedaref Total	2,788,911	1,097,021	39	1,149,004	41	536,287	19	6,599	-	-	-		542,886	19
Kassala	Hamashkoreib	403,014	60,452	15	141,055	35	141,055	35	60,452	15	-	-	3	201,507	50
	Kassala	502,358	125,589	25	175,825	35	175,825	35	25,117	5	-	-	3	200,942	40
	New Halfa	350,857	87,714	25	140,342	40	105,257	30	17,542	5	-	-	3	122,799	35
	North Delta	146,891	22,033	15	51,411	35	58,756	40	14,689	10	-	-	3	73,445	50
	Rural Al-Girba	163,670	40,917	25	57,284	35	57,284	35	8,183	5	-	-	3	65,467	40
	Rural Aroma	162,431	24,364	15	56,850	35	56,850	35	24,364	15	-	-	3	81,214	50
	Rural kassala	125,683	31,420	25	43,989	35	43,989	35	6,284	5	-	-	3	50,273	40
	Rural River Atbara	217,118	32,567	15	75,991	35	97,703	45	10,855	5	-	-	3	108,558	50
	Rural Wad Elhilaiw	133,683	20,052	15	60,157	45	46,789	35	6,684	5	-	-	3	53,473	40
	Rural West Kassala	246,654	61,664	25	86,329	35	86,329	35	12,333	5	-	-	3	98,662	40
	Talkook	434,098	65,114	15	173,639	40	151,934	35	43,409	10	-	-	3	195,343	45
	Kassala Total	2,886,457	571,891	20	1,062,876	37	1,021,773	35	229,917	8	-	-		1,251,690	43
Khartoum	Bahri	585,855	87,878	15	175,757	30	205,049	35	117,171	20	-	-	4	322,220	55
	Jebel awlia	1,372,555	137,256	10	549,022	40	480,394	35	205,883	15	-	-	3	686,277	50
	Karrari	1,303,459	195,519	15	391,038	30	521,384	40	195,519	15	-	-	3	716,903	55
	Khartoum	615,305	61,531	10	184,592	30	246,122	40	123,061	20	-	-	4	369,183	60
	Sharg an neel	1,132,347	113,235	10	452,939	40	452,939	40	113,235	10	-	-	3	566,174	50
	Um bada	1,657,923	165,792	10	497,377	30	663,169	40	331,585	20	-	-	4	994,754	60
	Um durman	398,718	59,808	15	119,615	30	139,551	35	79,744	20	-	-	4	219,295	55
Khartoum Total	7,066,162	821,018	12	2,370,339	34	2,708,608	38	1,166,197	17	-	-		3,874,805	55	



Population table (October 2023 - February 2024) continued

State	Locality	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#	%		#people	%
North Darfur	Al fasher	609,270	91,391	15	182,781	30	182,781	30	152,318	25	-	-	4	335,099	55
	Al koma	28,047	8,414	30	11,219	40	5,609	20	2,805	10	-	-	3	8,414	30
	Al leit	134,305	33,576	25	53,722	40	40,292	30	6,715	5	-	-	3	47,007	35
	Al malha	97,988	29,396	30	34,296	35	24,497	25	9,799	10	-	-	3	34,296	35
	As serief	66,668	26,667	40	26,667	40	10,000	15	3,333	5	-	-	3	13,333	20
	At tawisha	107,951	32,385	30	43,180	40	26,988	25	5,398	5	-	-	3	32,386	30
	At tina	42,339	12,702	30	16,936	40	8,468	20	4,234	10	-	-	3	12,702	30
	Dar as salam	132,634	39,790	30	59,685	45	26,527	20	6,632	5	-	-	3	33,159	25
	Kebkabiya	210,325	42,065	20	84,130	40	63,098	30	21,033	10	-	-	3	84,131	40
	Kelemando	77,871	23,361	30	35,042	45	11,681	15	7,787	10	-	-	3	19,468	25
	Kernoi	105,338	31,601	30	42,135	40	21,068	20	10,534	10	-	-	3	31,602	30
	Kutum	236,109	59,027	25	82,638	35	70,833	30	23,611	10	-	-	3	94,444	40
	Melit	175,687	52,706	30	61,490	35	52,706	30	8,784	5	-	-	3	61,490	35
	Saraf omra	170,469	59,664	35	76,711	45	25,570	15	8,523	5	-	-	3	34,093	20
	Tawila	78,145	19,536	25	27,351	35	23,444	30	7,815	10	-	-	3	31,259	40
	Um baru	119,532	41,836	35	53,789	45	17,930	15	5,977	5	-	-	3	23,907	20
Um kadadah	137,732	27,546	20	41,320	30	41,320	30	27,546	20	-	-	4	68,866	50	
North Darfur Total	2,530,410	631,666	25	933,093	37	652,809	26	312,842	12	-	-		965,651	38	
North Kordofan	Ar rahad (1)	174,843	52,453	30	52,453	30	52,453	30	17,484	10	-	-	3	69,937	40
	Bara	205,267	51,317	25	102,634	50	41,053	20	10,263	5	-	-	3	51,316	25
	Gebat al sheikh	249,763	74,929	30	99,905	40	62,441	25	12,488	5	-	-	3	74,929	30
	Gharb bara	176,816	53,045	30	53,045	30	53,045	30	17,682	10	-	-	3	70,727	40
	Sheikan	593,701	118,740	20	148,425	25	207,795	35	118,740	20	-	-	4	326,535	55
	Soudari	292,426	73,107	25	102,349	35	87,728	30	29,243	10	-	-	3	116,971	40
	Um dam haj ahmed	144,657	43,397	30	50,630	35	43,397	30	7,233	5	-	-	3	50,630	35
	Um rawaba	387,019	96,755	25	96,755	25	135,457	35	58,053	15	-	-	3	193,510	50
	North Kordofan Total	2,224,492	563,742	25	706,195	32	683,369	31	271,186	12	-	-		954,555	43
Northern	Ad dabbah	286,079	114,431	40	114,431	40	42,911	15	14,303	5	-	-	3	57,214	20
	Al burgaig	170,030	68,012	40	76,513	45	17,003	10	8,501	5	-	-	2	25,504	15
	Al golid	158,575	71,358	45	63,430	40	15,857	10	7,928	5	-	-	2	23,785	15
	Delgo	107,266	32,179	30	58,996	55	10,726	10	5,363	5	-	-	2	16,089	15
	Dongola	273,361	95,676	35	123,012	45	41,004	15	13,668	5	-	-	3	54,672	20
	Halfa	99,787	24,946	25	54,882	55	14,968	15	4,989	5	-	-	3	19,957	20
	Merwoe	291,858	87,557	30	145,929	50	43,778	15	14,592	5	-	-	3	58,370	20
	Northern Total	1,386,956	494,163	36	637,196	46	186,250	13	69,348	5	-	-		255,598	18
Red Sea	Agig	88,218	22,054	25	35,287	40	26,465	30	4,410	5	-	-	3	30,875	35
	Al Gunub and Awleb	131,842	32,960	25	59,328	45	32,960	25	6,592	5	-	-	3	39,552	30
	Dordieb	66,951	16,737	25	33,475	50	13,390	20	3,347	5	-	-	3	16,737	25
	Halaib	29,175	5,835	20	11,670	40	10,211	35	1,458	5	-	-	3	11,669	40
	Haya	328,181	82,045	25	131,272	40	98,454	30	16,409	5	-	-	3	114,863	35
	Jubayt elmaadin	113,125	28,281	25	50,906	45	28,281	25	5,656	5	-	-	3	33,937	30
	Port sudan	394,388	138,035	35	216,913	55	39,438	10	-	-	-	-	2	39,438	10
	Sawakin	94,418	33,046	35	47,209	50	9,441	10	4,720	5	-	-	2	14,161	15
	Sinkat	198,538	59,561	30	89,342	45	39,707	20	9,926	5	-	-	3	49,633	25
	Tawkar	187,555	46,888	25	93,777	50	37,511	20	9,377	5	-	-	3	46,888	25
	Red Sea Total	1,632,391	465,447	29	769,182	47	335,862	21	61,900	4	-	-		397,762	24



Population table (October 2023 - February 2024) continued

State	Locality	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#	%		#people	%
River Nile	Abu hamad	137,297	68,648	50	54,918	40	13,729	10	-	-	-	-	2	13,729	10
	Ad damar	510,446	255,223	50	204,178	40	51,044	10	-	-	-	-	2	51,044	10
	Al buhaira	90,725	31,753	35	36,290	40	18,145	20	4,536	5	-	-	3	22,681	25
	Al matama	315,582	110,453	35	173,570	55	31,558	10	-	-	-	-	2	31,558	10
	Atbara	270,468	108,187	40	135,234	50	27,046	10	-	-	-	-	2	27,046	10
	Barbar	264,279	105,711	40	132,139	50	26,427	10	-	-	-	-	2	26,427	10
	Shendi	499,231	149,769	30	274,577	55	49,923	10	24,961	5	-	-	2	74,884	15
	River Nile Total	2,088,028	829,747	40	1,010,908	48	217,875	10	29,498	1	-	-		247,373	12
Sennar	Abu hujar	244,201	97,680	40	85,470	35	48,840	20	12,210	5	-	-	3	61,050	25
	Ad dali	144,317	43,295	30	50,510	35	36,079	25	14,431	10	-	-	3	50,510	35
	Ad dinder	348,389	139,355	40	139,355	40	52,258	15	17,419	5	-	-	3	69,677	20
	As suki	399,249	179,662	45	179,662	45	39,924	10	-	-	-	-	2	39,924	10
	Sennar	550,603	302,831	55	165,180	30	55,060	10	27,530	5	-	-	2	82,590	15
	Sharg sennar	416,899	166,759	40	187,604	45	41,689	10	20,844	5	-	-	2	62,533	15
	Sinja	299,923	134,965	45	119,969	40	44,988	15	-	-	-	-	2	44,988	15
	Sennar Total	2,403,581	1,064,550	44	927,754	39	318,841	13	92,436	4	-	-		411,277	17
South Darfur	Al radoum	165,328	41,332	25	74,398	45	41,332	25	8,266	5	-	-	3	49,598	30
	Al wihda	69,263	17,316	25	24,242	35	20,779	30	6,926	10	-	-	3	27,705	40
	As salam - sd	120,099	30,025	25	42,035	35	30,025	25	18,015	15	-	-	3	48,040	40
	As sunta	161,440	24,216	15	56,504	35	64,576	40	16,144	10	-	-	3	80,720	50
	Beliel	359,468	53,920	15	125,814	35	107,840	30	71,894	20	-	-	4	179,734	50
	Buram	182,559	36,512	20	54,768	30	54,768	30	36,512	20	-	-	4	91,280	50
	Damso	178,559	44,640	25	71,424	40	44,640	25	17,856	10	-	-	3	62,496	35
	Ed al fursan	262,527	65,632	25	105,011	40	78,758	30	13,126	5	-	-	3	91,884	35
	Gereida	180,822	36,164	20	72,329	40	63,288	35	9,041	5	-	-	3	72,329	40
	Kas	248,249	62,062	25	86,887	35	74,475	30	24,825	10	-	-	3	99,300	40
	Kateila	141,470	35,368	25	56,588	40	42,441	30	7,074	5	-	-	3	49,515	35
	Kubum	227,605	45,521	20	79,662	35	68,282	30	34,141	15	-	-	3	102,423	45
	Mershing	101,273	20,255	20	30,382	30	30,382	30	20,255	20	-	-	4	50,637	50
	Nitega	127,130	25,426	20	44,496	35	38,139	30	19,070	15	-	-	3	57,209	45
	Nyala janoub	288,539	43,281	15	86,562	30	86,562	30	72,135	25	-	-	4	158,697	55
	Nyala shimal	402,888	60,433	15	120,866	30	120,866	30	100,722	25	-	-	4	221,588	55
	Rehaid albirdi	245,480	61,370	25	98,192	40	61,370	25	24,548	10	-	-	3	85,918	35
	Sharg aj jabal	14,826	2,224	15	4,448	30	5,189	35	2,965	20	-	-	4	8,154	55
	Shattaya	57,044	11,409	20	22,818	40	17,113	30	5,704	10	-	-	3	22,817	40
	Tulus	325,174	65,035	20	130,070	40	97,552	30	32,517	10	-	-	3	130,069	40
Um dafoug	77,796	19,449	25	35,008	45	15,559	20	7,780	10	-	-	3	23,339	30	
South Darfur Total	3,937,539	801,588	20	1,422,501	36	1,163,935	30	549,515	14	-	-		1,713,450	44	



Population table (October 2023 - February 2024) continued

State	Locality	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#	%		#people	%
South Kordofan	Abassiya	146,159	29,232	20	51,156	35	51,156	35	14,616	10	-	-	3	65,772	45
	Abu jubayhah	207,046	41,409	20	82,818	40	62,114	30	20,705	10	-	-	3	82,819	40
	Abu kershola	113,716	17,057	15	45,486	40	39,801	35	11,372	10	-	-	3	51,173	45
	Al buram	176,578	26,487	15	52,973	30	61,802	35	35,316	20	-	-	4	97,118	55
	Al leri	44,623	6,693	15	13,387	30	20,080	45	4,462	10	-	-	3	24,542	55
	Al quoz	131,931	19,790	15	46,176	35	39,579	30	26,386	20	-	-	4	65,965	50
	Ar rashad	74,077	11,112	15	33,335	45	22,223	30	7,408	10	-	-	3	29,631	40
	Ar reif ash shargi	68,149	10,222	15	20,445	30	23,852	35	13,630	20	-	-	4	37,482	55
	At tadamon - sk	89,001	17,800	20	35,600	40	26,700	30	8,900	10	-	-	3	35,600	40
	Delami	55,750	8,363	15	22,300	40	19,513	35	5,575	10	-	-	3	25,088	45
	Dilling	242,289	36,343	15	72,687	30	84,801	35	48,458	20	-	-	4	133,259	55
	Ghadeer	58,074	11,615	20	23,230	40	20,326	35	2,904	5	-	-	3	23,230	40
	Habila - sk	78,038	11,706	15	31,215	40	23,411	30	11,706	15	-	-	3	35,117	45
	Heiban	250,267	37,540	15	100,107	40	75,080	30	37,540	15	-	-	3	112,620	45
	Kadugli	166,611	24,992	15	49,983	30	58,314	35	33,322	20	-	-	4	91,636	55
	Talawdi	45,398	6,810	15	20,429	45	15,889	35	2,270	5	-	-	3	18,159	40
	Um durein	129,947	19,492	15	45,481	35	45,481	35	19,492	15	-	-	3	64,973	50
South Kordofan Total	2,077,654	336,662	16	746,809	36	690,123	33	304,060	15	-	-		994,183	48	
West Darfur	Ag geneina	679,249	67,925	10	135,850	20	271,700	40	203,775	30	-	-	4	475,475	70
	Beida	236,162	35,424	15	70,849	30	94,465	40	35,424	15	-	-	3	129,889	55
	Foro baranga	90,613	13,592	15	31,715	35	31,715	35	13,592	15	-	-	3	45,307	50
	Habila - wd	135,932	33,983	25	40,780	30	47,576	35	13,593	10	-	-	3	61,169	45
	Jebel moon	70,577	10,587	15	14,115	20	31,760	45	14,115	20	-	-	4	45,875	65
	Kereneik	413,940	62,091	15	124,182	30	144,879	35	82,788	20	-	-	4	227,667	55
	Kulbus	63,239	9,486	15	18,972	30	28,458	45	6,324	10	-	-	3	34,782	55
	Sirba	201,852	30,278	15	60,556	30	70,648	35	40,370	20	-	-	4	111,018	55
	West Darfur Total	1,891,564	263,365	14	497,017	26	721,200	38	409,982	22	-	-		1,131,182	60
West Kordofan	Abu zabad	117,298	29,325	25	35,189	30	29,325	25	23,460	20	-	-	4	52,785	45
	Abyei	128,025	32,006	25	38,408	30	32,006	25	25,605	20	-	-	4	57,611	45
	Al dibab	83,022	12,453	15	29,058	35	29,058	35	12,453	15	-	-	3	41,511	50
	Al idia	148,678	37,170	25	59,471	40	29,736	20	22,302	15	-	-	3	52,038	35
	Al khiwai	94,801	28,440	30	28,440	30	23,700	25	14,220	15	-	-	3	37,920	40
	Al lagowa	103,159	20,632	20	30,948	30	30,948	30	20,632	20	-	-	4	51,580	50
	Al meiram	55,988	13,997	25	16,796	30	16,796	30	8,398	15	-	-	3	25,194	45
	An nuhud	278,680	69,670	25	97,538	35	69,670	25	41,802	15	-	-	3	111,472	40
	As salam - wk	119,060	23,812	20	35,718	30	41,671	35	17,859	15	-	-	3	59,530	50
	As sunut	147,528	44,258	30	51,635	35	29,506	20	22,129	15	-	-	3	51,635	35
	Babanusa	60,997	9,150	15	21,349	35	21,349	35	9,150	15	-	-	3	30,499	50
	Ghubaish	159,464	47,839	30	55,812	35	31,893	20	23,920	15	-	-	3	55,813	35
	Keilak	78,872	11,831	15	27,605	35	23,662	30	15,774	20	-	-	4	39,436	50
	Wad bandah	160,100	40,025	25	56,035	35	40,025	25	24,015	15	-	-	3	64,040	40
	West Kordofan Total	1,735,672	420,608	24	584,003	34	449,343	26	281,719	16	-	-		731,062	42



Population table (October 2023 - February 2024) continued

State	Locality	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#	%		#people	%
White Nile	Ad diwaim	542,913	217,165	40	244,310	45	54,291	10	27,145	5	-	-	2	81,436	15
	Aj jabolain	443,695	155,293	35	177,478	40	88,739	20	22,184	5	-	-	3	110,923	25
	Al gitaina	422,675	126,802	30	211,337	50	63,401	15	21,133	5	-	-	3	84,534	20
	As salam / ar rawat	407,426	142,599	35	183,341	45	61,113	15	20,371	5	-	-	3	81,484	20
	Guli / Kosti	435,546	152,441	35	174,218	40	87,109	20	21,777	5	-	-	3	108,886	25
	Rabak	400,013	160,005	40	180,005	45	40,001	10	20,000	5	-	-	2	60,001	15
	Tendalti	248,329	86,915	35	111,748	45	37,249	15	12,416	5	-	-	3	49,665	20
	Um rimta	207,421	72,597	35	93,339	45	31,113	15	10,371	5	-	-	3	41,484	20
	White Nile Total	3,108,018	1,113,819	36	1,375,780	44	463,018	15	155,401	5	-	-		618,419	20
Grand Total	48,190,706	12,481,185	26	17,982,640	37	12,828,395	27	4,898,486	10	-	-		17,726,882	37	